COUNTER-CAPS REPORT:
THE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ARM
OF THE POLICE STATE

WE CHARGE GENOCIDE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After more than a year of protests against the police murder of Black people, police departments across the U.S. have an image problem. The Black Lives Matter movement has drawn public attention not just to high-profile deaths, but also to the routine violence and harassment young people of color experience at the hands of the police. The protests have created a crisis of legitimacy for both police departments across the country, and the institution of policing as it exists in the United States.

In this context, police are attempting to improve the strained relations between themselves and the communities they patrol, using the decades-old rhetoric of “community policing.”

This is a national shift. Community policing is a key pillar of Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. President Obama has advocated for community policing in a series of highly publicized speeches in Camden, NJ and more recently at the meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Chicago, IL.

The Chicago Police Department is no exception to this trend. The department is re-emphasizing community policing in an attempt to maintain its legitimacy. This is evidenced in the Department’s “listening tour” in the summer of 2015, which brought renewed attention to the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS).

Existing research shows that CAPS has not resulted in meaningful community control over police. Instead, police officers retain total control over decision-making and agenda-setting.

As examined in this report, “community policing” is the superficial involvement of select community members in providing police with legitimacy. “Community policing” acts as a shield for police. A self-selecting group of empowered community members, who are frequently gentrifiers, work with police to deflect criticism and build local support for policing.

Despite its more palatable label, Chicago’s “community policing” program is used to provide political cover for aggressive enforcement of so-called “quality of life” crimes—and even for the physical displacement of people of color from gentrifying neighborhoods.

From April to September 2015, Real Community Accountability for People’s Safety (RCAPS), a working group of We Charge Genocide (WCG), gathered data at CAPS meetings in several different neighborhoods across Chicago. Our research shows that CAPS’ primary function is to further mobilize residents already committed to police involvement, increasing police surveillance of a
community’s most vulnerable residents or visitors.

At CAPS meetings, police effectively deputize a small group of residents to engage in surveillance. These residents are disproportionately white property owners, especially in gentrifying neighborhoods. Their complaints reflect their implicit biases about who to consider “suspicious.” CAPS meetings legitimize and amplify these biases. Police encourage attendees to organize block groups and form phone trees, all with the goal of reporting “strange” license plates, “suspicious” behavior, and descriptions of cars and people passing through the neighborhood. This monitoring often includes focused surveillance on specific “problem buildings,” and group discussion of how to increase surveillance and reporting with the goal of evicting tenants seen as undesirable. Police also encourage residents to call the police for nearly any problem they experience, including minor issues such as profanity -- providing cover for aggressive policing strategies, and fracturing social bonds.

For this reason, we should understand CAPS—and community policing more generally—as an attempt to amplify the same policing approach that caused the crisis of legitimacy in the first place: policing against the community at large, and especially against the community members most likely to need real services and protection. Community policing programs undermine communities instead of strengthening them. Rather than facilitating broad-based, cooperative solutions, CAPS meetings train small, self-selecting groups to monitor their neighbors—and to turn to law enforcement interventions more frequently and quickly.

Community policing is not a serious solution. The work of the RCAPS working group shows that community policing insulates police from scrutiny and encourages the aggressive policing that have created a destructive cycle of police abuse and violent crime. With this mind, We Charge Genocide calls for divestment from funding the CPD and reinvestment in social services like education and public health that will meet real community needs. This realignment of resources, we contend, will do more to address social problems afflicting our city.
THE CRISIS OF POLICE LEGITIMACY AND COMMUNITY POLICING

Following the July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman for shooting and killing Trayvon Martin, a wave of protests ignited the Black Lives Matter movement. Subsequent protests over the police murders of Michael Brown and Eric Garner in 2014, Freddie Gray in 2015, the 2015 acquittal of the police officer who killed Rekia Boyd, and many other cases have directed new energy and attention toward policing and the criminal legal system.

Within this political context, police agencies nationwide are returning to community policing, seemingly in search of an idyll where police once knew their neighborhoods and patrolled their beats as though they were out for a neighborly stroll, and where Officer Friendly was real. Unfortunately, the positive relationships community policing seeks to recreate never existed for Black and poor communities in the United States. Whether it was the fugitive slave patrols in the South or attempts to control ethnic white immigrants, policing has always served and protected white comfort and white property.1 While community policing attempts to reimagine the history of policing as something out of Leave It to Beaver, we remember Watts.

Community policing programs are largely illusory—changing the rhetoric of policing, but not its actual practices.

And yet, scholarly research has found that community policing programs are largely illusory—they change the rhetoric of policing, but not its actual practices.2 Instead, community policing programs’ main purpose is to provide embattled police departments with a veneer of legitimacy. In his study of community policing in Seattle, William Lyons, a political scientist at the University

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of Akron, found that community policing excludes the most disadvantaged in the community. It is consistently the more powerful and connected residents who tend to form partnerships with police agencies—a self-selected group whose members generally do not have criticisms of law enforcement and do not ask police to alter their work. This tendency produces the most pronounced effect of these partnerships: shielding police agencies from criticism.⁵

In part, community policing owes its success to its ambiguity and media-friendly optics. Bernard Harcourt, a professor of law at Columbia University and practicing human rights lawyer, explains:

...the popularity and success of community policing is attributable in large part to the vagueness of the definition...and to the fact that the expression “community policing” is far more effective for public relations purposes than other terms such as “aggressive misdemeanor arrests,” stop and frisk, or “mass building searches.”⁶

Indeed, community policing has a strong punitive edge. In both its historical development and practical application, it blurs with “Broken Windows Policing,” aggressive enforcement of low-level violations leading to massive misdemeanor arrests.⁷ Officers often organize residents to report these crimes, effectively creating local “law and order” lobbies that advocate for more aggressive policing.

In short, community policing is a misnomer. These programs result in neither democratic accountability of police agencies nor meaningful changes in police practices. Instead, they mobilize a small group of residents to provide a façade of legitimacy that allows policing to continue as usual. Community policing can result in more aggressive policing as “respectable” residents lobby to the officers to aggressively enforce low-level, nonviolent street crimes.

CAPS and the Listening Tour

The shortcomings of community policing are evident in the principal community policing program of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS). There are three pillars to CAPS: (1) outreach by individual beat officers to build working relationships with citizens; (2) a system of monthly meetings in each of Chicago’s 281 beats; and (3) a complementary system of 25 District Advisory Committees, groups of community leaders that work with CPD district commanders to formulate community policies.\(^8\)

The largest community policing program in the country, CAPS is also one of the most scrutinized. Wesley Skogan, a political scientist at Northwestern University, began studying the program when it was still being planned in 1992. Based on 12 years of study and observations of more than a thousand beat meetings, and surveys of thousands of officers and residents, Skogan’s 2006 study, *Police and Community in Chicago*, is the definitive account of CAPS.

Like other studies on community policing, Skogan finds that these programs do not result in meaningful community control over police. Instead, police officers retain firm control of decision making and agenda-setting. Officers run beat meetings, set the agenda, and decide how to follow up. Participation in beat meetings is abysmally low, typically less than half a percent of the neighborhood.\(^9\) The result, Skogan notes, is depoliticized representation: limited participation without binding votes or any mechanism for public accountability.\(^10\) Skogan describes the program as “recapturing the legitimacy that police have, in large measure, lost in many of America’s minority communities.”\(^11\)

These programs do not result in meaningful community control over police.

In this regard, CPD’s recent attempts to address its own crisis of legitimacy are telling. In March of 2012, Dante Servin, an off-duty CPD detective, shot and killed Rekia Boyd, a 22-year-old Black woman. The case became flashpoint in Chicago. Servin was eventually acquitted on a technicality. The verdict was met with outrage and protests.\(^12\) The following week,

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\(^10\) Ibid, 141.

\(^11\) Ibid, 247.

CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy announced a “listening tour” to help repair the strained relationship between the police and Chicago’s diverse communities. For an effort premised on community engagement, the listening tour was shrouded in secrecy. Though some meetings were publicized to select community organizations, CPD told the media that the meetings were only for invited guests. The agency refused to produce a list of meetings until South Side Alderman Roderick Sawyer asked for one. When the public was able to get advance notice of the meetings, CPD turned them away. In Austin, a community area that often ranks among Chicago’s most violent neighborhood, residents with Westside Health Authority, a local non-profit, were denied entry to the listening tour stop.

The listening tour adds further support to Skogan’s findings. CAPS is not an attempt to develop equal partnerships or to cooperatively address problems. They are efforts to police through the community, to enlist certain community figures and organizations to enhance the power and legitimacy of the police.


RCAPS AND ITS FINDINGS

Participation in CAPS is low. In many Chicago communities, mere indifference is not a root cause of low participation. For Chicagoans from under-invested and neglected communities, CAPS meetings can be uncomfortable places. In these neighborhoods, the CPD resembles an occupying army that is best avoided. In gentrifying neighborhoods, many longtime residents worry that CAPS meetings are venues where disproportionately white, property-owning Chicagoans ask for more police to further criminalize their Black and Brown neighbors as part of an overall effort to push them out, quicken redevelopment and increase property values.

To investigate these concerns, We Charge Genocide (WCG) formed the Real Community Accountability for People’s Safety (RCAPS) working group. WCG is a grassroots, inter-generational, volunteer effort to center the voices and experiences of the young people most targeted by police and most impacted by police violence in Chicago. Since April 2015, RCAPS volunteers have gathered data at more than 15 CAPS meetings. In particular, RCAPS volunteers focused on gentrifying neighborhoods like Uptown, Rogers Park, Albany Park, Edgewater, Pilsen, Humboldt Park, and South Shore.

The observations of RCAPS volunteers both confirmed Skogan’s conclusions and identified previously unacknowledged problems. RCAPS observations show that participation in CAPS meetings is low, as Skogan noted. Between five and twenty residents attend each meeting. Rather than being driven by residents’ needs, CAPS meetings are places where a self-selecting group of residents are mobilized by police to surveil their communities, report information to CPD, target “bad buildings” and volunteer their time to “‘take back the streets’ in CPD-organized “positive loitering events.” These initiatives sharpen divisions within communities along lines of race and class and fracture social bonds.

Deputized Surveillance: In all the observed CAPS meetings, the officers moderating the event encouraged residents to treat their neighbors with suspicion. Across several sites, officers told attendees they were “eyes and ears” of the CPD and urged residents to report anything that seemed suspicious, including minor crimes like loitering and public consumption of alcohol. At one meeting, a resident asked if they should call to report the movement of cars that seemed suspicious, even if they had no reason to believe the car was stolen. The officer facilitating the meeting suggested that the residents report the license plates of all cars that they “do not recognize” or which are “suspicious” and call them in to the district so the plates can be run. “They don’t have to be doing anything,” the officer explained. “If you see someone that seems really out of place, call.”
But what constitutes “out of place” is subjective, and some residents are considered “out of place” even on their own property. At one meeting, a CAPS attendee boasted that he had “told [a 14 year old] boy next door that he’s not allowed to sit on [his] front porch anymore. He’s a target. I told him I’ll call the cops on him.” Another CAPS attendee added that his backyard backed up to the boy’s, and that they would call if the teenager as well. Rather than providing guidelines on when it is appropriate to file a police report, the officer running the meeting condoned residents’ plans to report a teenager in his own porch and yard.

In many communities, this type of deputized surveillance is formalized. In Rogers Park, the beat facilitator, a community member appointed by the CPD to help facilitate CAPS meetings, had formed a phone tree to ensure that multiple residents report any “unacceptable behavior” they notice, and then get others to call 911. The officer explained all calls for service are recorded so this kind of routine reporting establishes a pattern of behavior that can facilitate more action. In Albany Park, officers instructed residents to form “block clubs” that monitor their neighborhoods and phone-trees to ensure that “suspicious behavior” is reported several times. An officer explained repeated calls will likely increase police presence in those locations in the future.

Positive Loitering: CPD officers also directed CAPS attendees to be present in public space and at events, a tactic they labeled positive loitering. Positive loitering has two goals: recruiting new residents to CAPS, and “reclaiming” areas with reported drug and gang activity.

In the gentrifying neighborhood of Logan Square, an almost exclusively white group of attendees gathered in a public park, as a positive loitering event in response to recent gunshots in the neighborhood. Officers handed out flyers that encouraged residents to report non-emergency criminal behavior, as the president of the neighborhood association, a white woman, called the park a “gang motherland.” Despite recent demographic changes and development, she said the park still had problems with gangs. The beat facilitator, a retired white woman and longtime resident, told her fellow “loiterers” that the
neighborhood had changed dramatically in the last several years, attributing some of these changes to CAPS. She updated the group on efforts to get residents evicted from a suspected drug house.

In a gentrifying neighborhood like Logan Square, the political impacts of positive loitering are clear. When a group of white professionals rally with law enforcement officers, the group makes a claim of ownership over the neighborhood with no regard for the fact that they are the new ones on the block. They send a threatening message that Logan Square is no longer a working-class Latino neighborhood. The leadership of uniformed police officers in organizing these events is particularly problematic -- amounting to official support for efforts to displace poor and minority residents in gentrifying neighborhoods.

*Racially Coded Language:* Racially coded language permeates CAPS meetings. This dynamic is plainly evident in gentrifying neighborhoods, where the largely white group of CAPS attendees does not match the diversity of the area. When an officer tells a group of white residents to watch for "bad people," "people who look like they don't belong," and "guys with sagging pants," he is instructing them to monitor Black and Brown youth.

*Fracturing Communities:* While these types of community policing programs purport to build stronger communities, they instead fracture bonds of trust within communities and encourage neighbors to treat each other with suspicion.

The response of CAPS officers and attendees in the district 14 CAPS meeting to the Puerto Rican Festival and Parade is a telling example. Rather than understanding this officially licensed event as community celebration and an affirmation of one community’s culture, attendees at the CAPS meeting saw the Puerto Rican Festival and Parade as a safety concern that warranted an aggressive response. Specifically, they raised concerns about loud music, public consumption of alcohol, and “gang fights.” They called for a larger police presence, including the use of helicopters to disperse crowds. The CPD officers moderating the meeting appeared to agree with this assessment. They explained that the park perimeter was considered a gang hot spot for the duration of the festival and would be subject to an increased police presence. They told CAPS meeting attendees that they would try to get the helicopter for this year.

A similar dynamic is at work in the way CAPS officers framed memorials to shooting victims. CAPS officers explained that they treat these memorials “just like graffiti.” Their policy is to remove memorials and throw away the items. As long as there is not a crowd gathered, police will take down the memorial, extinguish candles and throw away items. Though police acknowledge that removing memorials is bad publicity and must be done when no one is around -- "they don't want cops kicking candles to the curb," one officer explained -- both their policy and their attitudes toward murder victims evince a callous disregard for the community’s grief. "This kid was on bullshit from the day he was born," one officer said of a shooting victim whose friends had erected a memorial. "They don't need to be honoring him."

*Anti-Community Policing:* This anecdotal evidence assembled by the RCAPS working group makes an important contribution to
our understanding of CAPS. Where Skogan’s comprehensive study shows that participation in CAPS is low and the program primarily operates to reaffirm police legitimacy, the RCAPS observations show that CAPS also deputizes residents to extend the reach of the police. We argue that CAPS—and community policing more generally—should be understood as anti-community policing. These programs do not strengthen communities. They train small, self-selecting groups to engage in organized surveillance, harassment and eviction of targeted renters.
There are real problems with crime in Chicago. While the city’s murder rates do not rank among the highest in the U.S., the city’s 400 to 500 murders a year are clearly unacceptable. At the same time, there are real problems with CPD’s approach to safety: a stop and frisk rate four times higher than New York City; the department’s Homan Square “black site,” where officers detained arrestees off the books; other abuses that have led to $521 million in settlements over the last decade; and a series of scandals that have marred the Independent Police Review Authority.\(^{18}\)

In fact, less policing may be the most appropriate response. There is a growing scholarly consensus that the U.S.’s incomparable rates of violent crime are a product of a uniquely aggressive style of policing. The national policy shift toward more targeted and aggressive policing—the so-called “War on Crime” that produced the highest incarceration rate in the world—actually predated the dramatic levels of violence that disproportionally impact poor communities of color.\(^{19}\) In particular, the decision to criminalize drug addiction, rather than treat it as a health issue, created an underground drug market regulated by violence.\(^{20}\) This turn toward punitive policing coincided with

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deindustrialization and the retrenchment of the welfare state. In a country shaped by segregation and other racial inequities, these policies created a perfect storm. Today, almost 60% of the prison population is Black or Brown.

Mass incarceration and aggressive policing have devastated our communities. Since anyone with a criminal record is forever “marked” and effectively unemployable, already impoverished communities reached new lows. Outsized incarceration rates for Black and Latino people—six times and three times greater, respectively, than those of whites—have destroyed family stability, effectively orphaning millions of children. This disruption wreaks a

26 Bruce Western and Becky Pettit, Collateral Costs: Incarceration's Effect on Economic Mobility,

profound psychological toll. Children of incarcerated parents experience high rates of trauma as result of their parents’ absence. In short, the combined effects of aggressive policing and mass incarceration create the conditions for extraordinary levels of violence.

This has created a self-perpetuating cycle of violence that, importantly, includes the continually expanding operations of police agencies. The violence that defines infamous Chicago communities like Austin and Englewood includes routine police harassment, surveillance, profiling, and even police killings. In 2014, the CPD shot 50 Chicagoans and killed 18. Nationwide, young black men today are 21 times more likely than their white peers to be killed by the police. Black youth are also more likely to find themselves in police crosshairs. Since 1980, 67 percent of the 151 teenagers and 66 percent of the 41 children under 14 who have been killed by police were Black. Between 2010 and 2012, police officers shot and killed 14 black teens running

away. This is the same official state sanctioned violence that led to the deaths of people like Rekia Boyd and Michael Brown.

It is time to break this cycle. The city needs to redistribute resources from the CPD and to neglected communities. The CPD currently occupies 39% of the city’s budget.  
31 Every helicopter that is flown, every bullet that is shot and every baton that is swung is not just an injury to those targeted by police. It is also a theft from the city’s struggling schools, health clinics, libraries and community centers.

The problems laid before police agencies are beyond their capacity to address. We can no longer expect police to manage a series of connected social problems rooted in poverty, joblessness, segregation, and the criminalization of drug addiction. Indeed, we now know that policing and mass criminalization and incarceration have done much to create these very problems. What is more, CPD has betrayed the public trust with a string of abuses, which existing accountability mechanisms have systemically failed to address.

The CPD’s listening tour and updated Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy is not a serious solution. The work of the RCAPS working group shows that community policing insulates police from scrutiny and encourages the aggressive policing that have created a destructive cycle of police abuse and violent crime. With this in mind, We Charge Genocide calls for divestment from the CPD and reinvestment in social services like education and public health that will meet real community needs. This realignment of resources will do more to address social problems afflicting our city.

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Works Cited


